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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the psychosocial construction of the conceptions of time and social 
change, and their relation with the notion of progress set up by modernity as well as their 
contradictory aspects, considering their historicity as psychosocial and social phenomena. The 
social construction of the notion of time is discussed; it responds to social organization forms, 
thus turning the social changes into historical and temporal landmarks. The association between 
social changes and social movements is argued and the concept of progress is deconstructed. 
Finally, the importance of the idea of movement in the construction of time, change and progress 
concepts is pointed out; it is also explained how modernity imbued such notions with direction 
and goals, in the direction of an arrow, according to the prevailing interests, while modeling 
them in its own image and likeness. 
Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river that drags me but I am the river; it is a 
fire that devours me, but I am the fire. 
Jorge Luis Borges (1947) 
 
Psychology and Temporality 
On considering time, psychology seems to have approached it as if it were a notion or 
concept of universal validity defined a priori. It was important to know how 
individuals had acquired that notion during the evolution process. Such consideration 
implicitly presupposed that once the notion was assimilated, the acquired object 
responded to a previously established canon which was fixed and invariable. Even 
taking into account cultural and historical differences as well as every variation they 
may introduce, the notion still supposes the existence of time as an entity in some way 
separate and independent to some extent from the subject that acquires it. 
From a psychosocial perspective, even though considerations of time received some 
attention within the social sciences and especially, in the emerging discipline of social and 
collective psychology at the beginning of the century - Halbwachs' works on the social 
frameworks of collective memory (1907; 1925) are a salient example- later on, time was 
restricted to the role of a mere "intervening variable", or of the object or content of 
mediating cognitive processes. In the psychological literature of the 40s, 50s and 60s it 
is possible to find more often than not that psychological phenomena are treated 
as time independent phenomena. Thus, the historical nature of psychological 
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processes became but a reference, a trivial detail that made no contribution to the 
topic in question. Some even considered that if an event was historical, it lay beyond the 
interest of psychology. 
However, the panorama started to change as from the 70s. In 1973 Kenneth Gergen 
published an article which shook the academic spheres. In that paper he stated that 
Social Psychology should be considered a historical inquiry, since many of the 
phenomena it studies are unique, besides fluctuating throughout time, a fact strong 
enough in itself to provide the study of psychological phenomena with a socio-
historical frame. This article opened the way to the introduction of the historical 
conception of pychosocial phenomena within the field of Anglo-Saxon social 
psychology. It should be mentioned that within the social sciences the need to 
acknowledge that historical nature of social phenomena had already been remarked in Latin 
America and in some European countries (France, Italy). However, psychology cannot be 
regarded as a pioneer discipline in this respect, probably due to the prevailing 
influence of the mainstream psychology carried out in the United States at that time. 
The construction of a new paradigm, as well as the transformations derived from the 
practice relative to material conditions of life specific for the different historical, 
economic and social contexts would introduce the force of circumstances into 
the academic field and start the critical revision of the time independent condition 
(Montero, 1978). In spite of resistance, once the historical nature has been acknowledged, 
it is difficult to maintain the time independent condition attributed to psychological events. 
The 80s and 90s show the growing importance of the discussion about the temporal 
nature of Psychology and its condition of social construction (Parker, 1989; Montero, 
1994). Moreover, the proposition that the historical perspective may be regarded as a 
means to challenge naturalized convictions and to study the notion of time in its 
psychosocial dimension is stated. 
Thus, Gergen's idea is renewed in 1994 by Blackman, who proposes an "archaeological" 
consideration of Psychology as a histyory of the present, bearing a fundamental 
responsibility for the constitution of the contemporary psychological objects. This 
position emphasizes the constructed and relative nature of psychological 
knowledge, which means this is not a natural process but one determined both culturally 
and temporally. Even though these articles broaden the scope of Psychology, the history 
of contemporary facts and events does not exhaust for researchers the issue of 
apprehending the variations, the unique phenomena demanding a vision of continuity, of 
duration. Nor does it exhaust the inquiry into the psychological aspects of the nature of 
that essential dimension called time. 
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The notion of time 
Time has been defined in various ways: as a becoming, i.e. as "the extent to which the 
different states of a same thing develop", or to which "different things occur in the 
same place" (Moliner, 1994: 1307). Also, time has been assigned the quality of flow 
which has come to be regarded as pathetic for it refers to the "succession of instants 
that inexorably come and go by and in which life and activity take place" (Moliner, idem). 
This idea is centered on the ephemeral nature of time and, on the perishable nature of 
life constructed within it. From youth to the Spanish poet Bcquer's "dark swallows", 
including the Heraclitean waters, as Teresa de Avila said, todo se pasa [everything goes 
by]. Depending on the outlook, this can be either a terrifying or a comforting idea 
since defining time is a question of how the moments before and after certain events are 
perceived -as Aristotle sustained (the here and now that is not)- or Einstein's time-
illusion, or the time-degradation of entropic phenomena (Prigogine, 1991). And today -as 
much as in the 6th century- time remains as indefinable as it was for Saint Augustine (the 
having been that no longer is). (1) 
 
The social construction of time: the temporal landmarks 
The aforementioned definitions present some common features: they are based either on 
the presence of discernible and important changes for individuals subject to them, or on 
the idea of development, of passing of time. This leads me to pose some questions: Is the 
process of becoming the result of the passing of time? Do psychological phenomena exert 
an influence on that process in such a way that those processes become temporal 
landmarks? In the first case, time would have an existence per se. Time would pass by, 
elapse, regardless of the occurrence of relevant events. In the second proposition, time 
is considered to be the result of the social events that mark changes. It is 
considered as a construction produced by the social relationships in which events of 
individual and social importance point out moments, highlighting them according to the 
transformations introduced in daily life. An example of this is the course of the sun, 
which brings light and darkness introducing sensitive environmental changes that affect 
our daily life. Years, seasons, weeks, days, hours, minutes, seconds and so on do not 
constitute "natural" phenomena (as the rotation of stars does). 
They are social constructions of mankind, made with reference to measurements 
established according to celestial phenomena, that have not always been the same. 
Therefore, it is not possible -within the scope of this presentation- to accept a 
classification such as the one made by Ferrarotti (1987). Ferraroti distinguishes four 
fundamental times: an individual biographical time; a historical time subdivided 
into a macrohistorical one, a political-institutional one and one related to the current 
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economic situation; an ahistorical or sacred time and a natural time. Even if the three 
first categories include facts which depend on social relations, when it comes to the 
last category Ferraroti introduces the naturalization of a way of measuring time. This 
naturalization is not less social than the other categories; thus it is as dependent as they 
are on intersubjectivity. And, moreover, it blurs the distinction between the phenomena 
it sets out to mark with what it marks. 
Likewise, the passing of time, the idea of time as a kind of current flowing towards some 
destiny, is typically modern. It should be acknowledged that the relation between time and 
movement already existed in ancient times. However, it is modernity that legalizes, 
systematizes and imparts a new direction to this notion. Latour (1994: 92) sustains that 
this perspective entails "a particular form of historicity", which can be interpreted in different 
ways: as a cycle, as decadence, as a fall, as instability, as return, or as a continuous 
presence. In consequence, this concept should be referred to as temporality, in order to 
differentiate it from time (Latour, 1994: 92). 
Time measurements are ways to introduce a socially determined order. At the 
psychological level, we use the terms "beliefs", "attitudes", "attributions", "representations" 
and in general "forms of social categorization" in order to describe the ways people 
represent their knowledge of the world. Devices are, thus, generated to help order and 
regulate daily life, as well as to explain and evaluate events, trying to understand and 
apprehend them by means of common sense and also according to a socially 
constructed order. 
Social and individual events affect life according to the meaning people assign to 
them; these events become ways of expressing the temporal nature of social life because 
they originate changes. People who produce such events and are affected by them, 
construct them as temporal markers. Social transformations affect our behavior in such a 
way that we generate beliefs about them and we socially construct a temporal sense 
granting continuity to those mutations. As Latour states (1994, p. 101): "Time is not a 
general framework but the provisional result of the relationship between beings". 
Because of this, it is possible to find elements belonging to different conceptions of 
time within a given society. So finally, as well as at the beginning, it is the human agent 
who determines the content of time constructing history, because the notion of time is a 
consequence of relationships among human beings. 
As Halbwachs expressed (1907/1977: 143), individuals in isolation can lose the notion of 
time, finding themselves "unable to measure duration". This author also proposed an idea 
which was apparently disregarded at that time: "Social life implies that everyone agrees as 
regards time and duration and that everyone knows all the conventions they are subject 
to". Thos social conventions would apply to specific human groups rather than being 
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applicable to mankind as a whole. 
This happens because time is constructed in intersubjectivity, the space where the 
social and the individual become one through the social creation of meaning, through 
signification. It is within the relationships created by interacting individuals that space 
acquires meaning and time is constructed as part of that relationship and defined by it. 
Time does not exist outside relationships. Thus, it is not time that blurs relationships or 
makes them fade away. It is rather the erosion of those relationships and the 
disappearance of those memories, in other words, the transformation of the cognitive and 
affective remains of those activities in remembrance establishes temporal changes and 
creates the archaeology of daily life. The past is the result of the transformations in our 
relationships. Levinas (1994: 127) poses a question regarding that problem: Can we 
understand time as the relation with the other, instead of visualizing it in relation with 
the end? That question should not be stated as a dilemma, since both beginning and end 
exist as a function of the relationships with the other. The future is the virtual space 
where our expectations and goals to be achieved lie. It is a space that modernity has 
constructed as placed ahead; a space towards which we are supposed to head for 
according to a specific rationality. 
 
The association between time, change and movement 
It is only within a critique of Modernity that the idea of social changes as time landmarks 
can be borne. Such critique is supported by the decision to question those aspects of 
social life so deeply naturalized that they have become indisputable, and are regarded as 
essential aspects of life, of nature, of the universe. 
The first aspect to be taken into consideration is the association between change and 
movement. In this sense, Aristotle (ed. 1952:278) differentiated six types of change or 
movement, expressed as transformations produced "between what is completely real 
and what is potential". Or, in other words, from the beginning to the end of a 
phenomenon. Those categories are: 1) alteration, 2) increase, 3) decrease, 4) becoming, 
5) ceasing to be, and 6) locomotion. This classification indicates that change amounts to 
movement and is defined by the type of transformation detected in things. Or to be 
more precise, in the way things are usually perceived. Likewise, Aristotle (1952) 
considered that every object and being seeks perfection when not prevented from 
achieving it by obstacles posed by other objects and individuals. Thus, perfection was 
defined as the realization of the true nature. In this way, he introduced an agent or external 
cause that predetermined a goal and established a canon, placing the definition of that 
nature beyond human limits. Although this supposes a movement towards a state 
considered as optimum because it is the appropriate one, this does not mean progress. It 
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only indicates a movement towards the most convenient form of realization. Modernity 
transforms this idea by investing it with a direction and a self-changing goal: use of 
technology, industrialization. 
Though the idea of progress is already outlined in the illuminists, in Adam Smith and in 
Saint Simon, who foresaw social bliss as goal for development, the enunciation of this 
conception has its best expression in Augusto Comte's Discourse on the Positive 
Spirit (1844/1965). It can be seen in the law of the three stages: the theological, the 
metaphysical and the positive. According to that law the progression is from the first to 
the third stage in what Comte considered a "fundamental movement of humankind" 
(1844/1965: 57). Order and progress would lead to greater perfection and in turn 
progress was defined as the "continuous advancement towards a determined goal" 
(Comte, 1844/1965: 111): perfecting human nature. This was achievable through 
rationality, afterwards expressed in science, technique and a particular economic system. 
These ideas in turn influence the concept of time, introducing what has come to be 
termed as "the arrow of time", pointing to a direction in particular and having an 
irreversible path. This is the idea behind the notion that progress is the result of going 
forwards and upwards, of ascending and advancing. 
 
The blurred character of social change 
Change is a concept belonging to everyday life and common sense. In them, as in the 
social sciences, it is difficult to define. As with many other common sense notions, every 
person assumes s/he knows what it means; however, nobody has a precise notion. Its 
imprecise condition is probably the reason for this characteristic of being open enough to 
adapt to many circumstances and being assimilated by everybody. What really happens, 
however, is that change -as time-is social and individually constructed, defined and 
traced within a relation established between people and their environment. Social life is 
the interaction between the individual and the collective, macrosocial and microsocial 
levels interrelating in such a way that the limits between them become blurred. Both 
individuals and groups attribute meaning to certain events considered -personally or 
collectively- significant enough to introduce new ways of behavior. For some individuals, 
certain facts and events are crucial, this being the cause for them to adjust their behavior 
to them, or for them to put into action ways of assimilating what is going on to their 
established way of life. Any of the two ways, accommodation or assimilation, is 
bound to introduce transformations. 
Even when the area of social change looks blurred, its orientation -according to Ibáñez 
(1987)- is fairly well defined, for those changes are directed towards the following 
goals: 1) social complexity, 2) emphasis on the independence of different societies, 3) 
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sophistication in the control devices and the power systems, 
4) promotion in the position occupied by technological devices in social life and 
5) growing importance in the role scientific knowledge and its mediation between 
individuals and "things" plays. 
 
Change, development and progress 
Modernity has turned us into the habit of relating social changes with transformations 
produced within development patterns. Development is understood, from a 
macrosocial perspective, as a specific model of advancement or improvement in relation 
to a particular state, usually a socioeconomic situation. Progress has in turn been defined, 
a has been said, as "Advancement. Marching forwards. Action and effect of growing or 
improving any thing" (Moliner, 1994: 854). As well as civilization, specially when referred 
to the "cultural development of humankind or of a country, in general, or in a determined 
period or aspect" (Moliner, idem). This sends us to the nineteenth century Spencerian 
social evolutionism, with its stages in which progress would go from a savage to a 
barbarian condition and from there to civilization. Ferrater Mora (1975: 487) adds 
that such process or evolution defining progress incorporates values. That is, it is 
burdened with forms of assessment socially determined. 
Western culture has established industrialization and a high per capita income as 
signs of development and progress. This means that in the spheres of established power, 
industrial and technological innovations shall be well received for they may turn out to be 
sources of wealth, that is often associated with progress and development. 
However, not every innovation is bound to produce immediate satisfaction or even be 
perceived as positive. Some of them imply changes in the relations of power that may be 
considered dangerous for the statu quo, or as threatening to oppose it, and are 
denounced as either unfair or capable of increasing social problems. Even in those groups 
that accept the definition of development as the last stage in the line of social evolution, as 
made evident in a research carried out by Idler (1994), contradictions may exist: accepting 
science and technology as necessary goals and at the same time questioning them, in the 
sense of considering that they produce a moral vacuity, and show an absence of ethical 
values, a lack of credibility in human potential and some incredulity in the promise, 
inherent to Modernity, of achieving social welfare and harmony. The "lack of ethical 
values" should not be assumed in this case as absence but rather as a substitution or 
change of certain values for others considered less virtuous or moral, according to an 
apparently transitional canon. 
Besides, there is another problem: What about cultural development? How is it to be 
assessed? Culture refers to systems of interaction between people and the socially 
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constructed environment. It is related to lifestyles shared by social groups. In those 
groups, collective forms of thinking developed within specific societies, lead to the 
development of a shared vision of the world. The wealth of a culture does not depend on 
the degree of industrialization or the technological capacity of a society, it is not ruled by 
the same logic and cannot be measured with the same criteria. Therefore, it cannot be 
assessed in a continuum related with other manifestations of culture, for each one 
originates in different sources and makes use of different forms of expression. This means 
not only that culture and economic development are orthogonal dimensions but also that 
social systems are not homogeneous. 
 
Change, stability and resistance to change 
Change and stability in social groups, transformation and stagnation in societies have 
raised several worries in the social sciences. Both change and permanence are the result 
of human behavior and inter-influence psychological processes. 
Social movements are often considered promoters of social change. Precisely, the 
relations they produce not only produce changes but these changes in turn constitute 
those movements. So these relations are both a consequence and their own cause. The 
transformations that take place within and without social movements, as part of the 
interchanges and interactions already mentioned, are endowed with a meaning, thus 
becoming time landmarks, temporal markers. 
Social movements as privileged factors of social change seem to answer to the idea they 
mobilize, or set into motion resources that were paralyzed to that date. This gives an 
idea of previous stability that finds its roots in a concept of inactive statu quo contradicting 
the observation that society is essentially dynamic and the fact that in order to prevent 
change an intense activity has to be displayed. When performing such actions many 
transformations take place, whose objective is stabilizing a state, or slowing down the 
rhythm of change. 
This states one of the most interesting enigmas in the social sciences: how do cultures 
manage -in spite of cultural change- to keep their distinctiveness so that they can be 
recognized throughout time and space? It seems that researches, when dealing with social 
change, favor the study of social movements, separating them in some way from everyday 
events, not paying due attention to the research about everyday life, the realm in which 
cultural practices are repeated without changes once and again, introducing modifications 
at the same time. Or, as Bachelard (1992, pp. 79-80) says, introducing innovations in a 
kind of repetition that in itself is constructive; so that habits, those apparently repetitive 
ways of always doing the same, shall introduce small new elements which eventually 
become progresses. This leads to an intriguing aspect: the imprecise and repeated acts 
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through which we keep ourselves doing what is considered to be traditional, and at the 
same time we are building something different which shall produce a future, different from 
the present in which we are living. 
Dramatic and unexpected events also have to be taken into account together with the 
repetitive ways of behavior. The same can be said with respect to innovations. 
However, their emergence does not imply the disappearance of every way of behavior 
previous to them. Transformation and conservation take place simultaneously, within the 
same space, though not exactly at the same time. This paradox is possible because the 
disruptive elements become landmarks helping our memory to construct time, whereas the 
constant repetition of everyday actions does not usually turn out to be a temporal 
marker, even though those actions maintain the rhythm of life. 
Two conceptions interpret human condition in relation to change and stability. One 
is the Aristotelian idea according to which the natural state of the bodies is rest (Aristotle, 
1952), stability. Thus, the circumstances being the same, the people will choose to carry 
out those actions requiring less effort. According to this idea, for a change to take place, 
movement has to be induced while a final cause is required for bodies to move or 
perform an action. The other conception is the Galilean one, which states that 
movement is the natural state and some kind of external drive is required to stop it. 
Moghaddam & Crystal (1997; 357) criticize how the theories of inter-group relationships 
consider some aspects of change while continuing to ignore constancy. Based on 
their observations, they reckon research on social constancy poses a much more 
complex problem than why and how changes take place. These authors wonder why is 
it that despite the social movements, despite the leaders' example and works, things do 
not change proportionally to the efforts made; why is it that very often things seem to keep 
the same pace and direction the change of which was sought. Hence, they wonder 
why continuity exists, why certain behavior models persist. 
Harré & Moghaddam (1995, cited by Moghaddam & Crystal, 1997) explain this puzzle by 
way of the theory of what they call social reducton. A reducton would be an elemental 
unit of social behavior, similar to the subatomic particle known as proton. Its elemental 
nature derives from being carried out without a conscious effort, due to aptitudes socially 
acquired by the person during the socialization process. Reductons would correspond to 
what is culturally defined as proper or correct behavior, which is socially expected and 
produced in an almost automatic way, so that changes planned to be carried out at a 
macrosocial level do not consider or affect the basic behavior. 
Cultural change takes place at macrosocial levels, such as the level of public institutions 
(v.g. the media, educational systems, the church); but it also occurs at microsocial levels, 
such as in the social practices of everyday life. And the activity that takes place at one 
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level may offer resistance, oppose or ignore the activity carried out at another level. Such 
opposition, resistance or ignorance may slow down the rhythm of the change sought. 
The social reducton theory states that "the maximum speed at which change may take 
place at the macro level (...) is faster than the potential maximum speed of change at the 
microsocial level" (Moghaddam & Crystal, 1977: 358). This means that social change 
needs to reach the psychological level and gain access to individuals so as to achieve its 
goals. In brief, this means that social changes will only take place when carried out by 
concrete people who welcome or cause them. Enforced social change inexorably requires 
human agents to carry it out. 
Bourdieu (1972), provides a different explanation in his theory about how people give 
continuity to their daily tasks throughout their lives. He proposes the notion of habitus, a 
concept bearing similitude with the one later defined by Moghaddam & Crystal as 
reductons, leaving aside, however, the fragmentary character of such notion. The habitus 
is defined as: 
... a system of durable and transposable dispositions which, by encompassing 
all past experiences, constantly functions as a matrix of perceptions  and actions and 
enables the fulfillment of infinitely differentiated tasks thanks to the analogical transfers of 
schemes that allow to solve the problems in the same way, owing to the ongoing 
corrections of the results obtained, dialectically produced by these results. (Bourdieu, 
1972: 178-179). 
These are durable regularities taking place within socially constructed milieus that 
structure our behavior while structuring themselves in such a way that these structures 
establish patterns. The habiti are regulated and regular practices and representations 
which ease social relations creating links between people and their actions. They are 
executed without a conscious direction, not paying attention to specific directions or 
domain, while regulated and adjusted, at the same time, to collective rules. The habitus 
allows human beings to face unexpected situations and events, implicitly anticipating 
the consequences of such circumstances. The habitus represents a socially encoded 
and expected answer that tends to reproduce objective social structures which it 
maintains and belongs to and from which it is the result. Moreover, the habitus does not 
bear any strategic intention. 
Bourdieu's notion of habitus emphasizes its cultural nature as well as the "natural" way of 
accepting it, in the sense that it is carried out without awareness of doing something that 
has an aim and a specific was of being done. A habitus is carried out without thinking. Its 
strength lies in the fact that it is neither analyzed nor questioned, while being at the same 
time the link that makes up the behavior models and chains constituting daily life and 
supporting society. This is a holistic perspective with a cultural approach which presents 
Orientación y Sociedad - 2000 - Vol. 2 11
the habitus not as a behavior unit but rather as part of a whole. The concept of habitus 
does not reduce social behavior to elemental fractions. Its aim is to explain how culturally 
established behavior models are kept through unperceived regularities that become part 
of daily life. 
What I perceive in this is that the movement generating progress and directing time is 
not a time independent regularity. The changes taking place in a particular sphere of 
society, the innovations that revolutionize the sciences, or politics or the intellectual world 
of a social group, do not necessarily affect to the same extent or degree most of the 
society. People begin to respond to such changes only when they are experienced, 
when they affect a person's daily life, the answers being influenced by their history. Then, 
time acquires other markers that allow to judge the speed or slowness of its course. 
 
The illusion of movement: deconstructing time 
Is the arrow of time irreversible? What happens when movement in one direction is 
interrupted? Does a revolution always mean progress? Does the absence of a 
revolution mean uninterrupted progress? These are other questions that the lineal 
conception of time bring to my mind. 
Revolutions may be seen as more or less acute changes in a continuum, that interrupt it 
without utterly breaking it. Latour says in relation to this, that revolutions "cannot 
remove the past" (1994: 101), though they establish limits, divisions, frontiers thus 
indicating what has been left behind and where another "now" and a possible "ahead" are 
to begin. That is to say, they are time landmarks. Therefore, the very idea of modernity as a 
social evolution scenario is being challenged. As Latour says (1994: 103), "we have 
never gone forwards or backwards. We have always actively chosen elements 
belonging to different times" and "... it is selection that that makes time, and no time 
that that makes the selection". Modernity considered as current, as present, those 
aspects of social life that grew at the same pace as industrialization, while disregarding as 
"archaic, irrational or conservative" that which did not fit the system. 
However, when the modern idea of time is deconstructed, time does not seem to be a 
bullet directed in only one direction. It is particular rather than general and -as 
already stated- it depends on human relationships. Psychological research has rendered 
data that show how that which has come to be known as modernity is a way of life that 
has influenced people (producing a "modern" person) so that they may adapt to the 
demands and relations leading to the modernity they themselves construct. In this 
regard, Table 1 shows the characteristics assigned to the modern person, and Table 
2, those assigned to modernity. This very necessity to define what is modern marks the 
coexistence of different ways of existing, being and defining, creating different times. 
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Tabla 1 
 
Tabla 2: characteristics of modernity 
Sources; Gergen, 1991; Montero,1994; Ibáñez,1996 
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Social construction of time is produced by what Sawaia (1997) calls argumentative 
communities. Such construction is part of the permanent conversation and 
gestures, of the whispers and screams, of naming and renaming, of the communicative 
process, which is also a significant and attributive process expressed in the social 
influence and resistance. 
 
Some final considerations 
Modernity regarded movement both as origin and nature of change. Paradoxically, this 
idea comes from Aristotle, despite the fact that he considered rest as the natural 
condition of the human being, while modernity supports a view centered upon 
dynamics. However, movement in modernity is endowed with a direction, a sense of 
motion (forwards) and leads to the use of technology, to industrialization, to capitalism, 
to liberalism, through a way of making science: a hypothetico-deductive one. 
Advancement is considered equivalent to progress, and progress is the movement 
directed in the same course as development. In turn, development is only that which 
achieves the aims set up by modernity. 
Advancement meant leaving behind stages and levels deprived of certain conditions, for 
once those stages are reached, they suppose a status from which it is impossible to 
go back. What is more, it seems as if at the same time advancement towards a 
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progress goal is made, the past were not only left behind but also moved in the 
opposite direction, going further away, taking distance from the present. In fact, the 
functionalist trend so important in the social sciences during the 20th century, solved the 
relation with the past by stating that if a phenomenon exists at present, that is because it 
has a function, and that quality is responsible for its perpetuation in time. If a 
phenomenon is present today, it was present before. Hence, the past is of no interest 
whatsoever, the study of the present being enough. 
The Latin poet Virgil said Tempus fugit; however, it is not time what runs away, but 
rather the words and actions that will not repeat themselves in their unique nature, 
even when being part of the repeated gestures of everyday life. Another poet, Horace 
used the expression Carpe diem, which may be a notion befitting a constructionist 
perspective of time best, for even when it assumes that the day may escape our intention 
to seize it, it also acknowledges the possibilities of human intervention. 
The critical perspective developed in the field of social psychology in the last twenty 
years compels us not to accept as essential any definition or concept, no matter how 
natural it may seem. The ideological character of naturalizations is currently denounced 
in the most various geographical and theoretical settings. And time, that dimension which 
not only rules our daily lives but also our memory, does not escape deconstruction. A 
different conception of time seems to be finding its own place within the field of 
sciences. A conception in which human beings do not appear as passive subjects in 
relation to time, running behind it, against it, measuring it, wasting it, being its victims 
and slaves, facing a phenomenon assumed to be powerful and independent. A 
conception in which time is revealed in its character of social construction, 
acknowledging that it is part of the relationships in which we become who we are. 
 
Notes 
(*). Addres presented at the Ill Congreso Internacional de Psicología "La Psicología y sus contextos". 
Universidad de las Américas. Santa Catarina Mártir, Cholula, Puebla. 12 - 14 November 1998. 
1. Let us remember the famous quote by St. Augustine: "¿Quod est ergo tempus?" Si nemo ex me 
quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio" (Confessions: Book XL. 400/1951) "What is 




1. Aristóteles (1952). Physics.[Física} Chicago, USA: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. Vol.8 (1) 
2. Blackman, L. (1994). What is doing History?: The use of History to understand the 
constitution of contemporary psychological objects. Theory & Psychology, 4(4), 485-504. 
3. Boudon, R. (1977). Effets pervers et ordre social. Paris: P.U.F.  
Orientación y Sociedad - 2000 - Vol. 2 15
4. Enciclopedia Internacional de las ciencias sociales (1975). Vol. 7.  
5. Ferrarotti, F. (1987). II ricordo e la temporalita. Roma: La Terza. 
6. Gergen, K. J. (1973). Social Psychology as History. journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 28(2), 309-320. 
7. Halbwachs, M. (1925/1976). Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire. Paris: Mouton.  
8. Halbwachs, M. (1907/1977). La mémoire collective. Paris: Albin Michel. 
9. Ibáñez, T. (1987). Pouvoir, conversion et changement social. En S. Moscovici & G. Mugny 
(Eds.), Psychologie de la conversion (pp. 219-138). Cousset, Switzerland: Del Val. 
10. Idler, J. (1994). Representaciones sociales del progreso en estudiantes de psicología y estudiantes 
de sociología. Caracas, Venezuela: Universidad Central de Venezuela, Escuela de Psicología. 
Tesis de Licenciatura. 
11. Inkeles, A. (1966). Modernización del hombre. En M. Weiner (Ed.), Modernización (pp. 179-
194). México: Robles. 
12. Latour, B. (1994). Nous n'avons jamais été modernes. Paris: La Découverte.  
13. Levinas, E. (1994). Dios, la muerte y el tiempo. Madrid: Cátedra. 
14. Moghaddam, F. M. y Crystal, D. S. (1997) Revolutions, Samurai and Reductons: The 
Paradoxes of Change and Continuity in Iran and Japan. Political Psychology, 18(2), 355-384. 
15. Moghaddam, F. M. y Harré, R. (1995). Psychological Limitations to Political Revolutions: An 
application of Social Reducton Theory. Berlin: Trabajo presentado en el Internationl 
Congress on the Occasion of the 225th Birthday of H. Hegel. (cit. por Moghaddam y Crystal, 
1997). 
16. Montero, M. (1994). Un paradigma para la psicología social. reflexiones desde el quehacer 
en América Latina. En M. Montero (coord.) Construcción y crítica de la psicología social. 
Barcelona: Anthropos. 27-48. 
17. Parker, I.A. (1989). The crisis in modern social psychology - And how to end it. London: 
Routledge. 
18. Prigogine, I. (1991). El nacimiento del tiempo. Buenos Aires: Tusquets. 
19. Sawaia, B. (1997). A legitimidade subjetiva no processo de participacão social na era da 
globalizacão. En L. Camino et al., Estudos sobre comportamento político. Teoría e pesquisa (pp. 
149-159). Florianópolis, Brasil: Letras Contemporáneas. 
20. Yang, K. S. (1988). Will societal modernization eventually eliminate cross-cultural 
psychological differences? En M. H. Bond (Ed.), The cross-cultural challenge to social 
psychology. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
